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Speech Act Verbs
K Proost, Institut für Deutsche Sprache, Mannheim ,
Germany
Definition and Terminology
The term ‘speech act verbs’ has variously been defined 
as applying either to all verbs used to refer to any type 
of verbal behavior or to the much smaller subset 
of verbs expressing specific speaker attitudes. Accord­
ing to the first, more encompassing definition, verbs 
such as to claim, to promise, to threaten, to praise, 
to boast, to complain, to say, to whisper, and to 
interrupt all count as speech act verbs, whereas the 
last three of this set are excluded by the second and 
stricter definition. The terms ‘illocutionary verbs,’
‘verbs of communication,’ and ‘verbs of saying,’
which have been used as synonyms of ‘speech act 
verbs,’ have likewise been defined in either a more 
or less inclusive fashion. Because verbs such as to say, 
to whisper, and to interrupt do not lexicalize speaker 
attitudes, they are semantically less specific than 
speech act verbs in the narrow sense of the term. For 
this reason, this contribution is concerned only with 
speech act verbs that lexicalize combinations of 
speaker attitudes.
Speech act verbs are used to refer to situations 
characterized by the following features or situational
roles: a speaker (S), a hearer (H), a set of speaker 
attitudes, and an utterance (Utt) mostly containing a 
proposition (P). These four elements are part of any 
situation referred to by speech act verbs and constitute 
the unifying feature of the meaning of these verbs 
(Verschueren, 1980: 51-57; 1985: 39-40; Wierzbicka, 
1987: 18; Harras etal., 2004: Intro.). They distinguish 
them from other elements of the lexicon, especially 
from other types of verbs. Adopting the terminology 
used by Harras et al. (2004) here I call the type of 
situation referred to by all speech act verbs the ‘general 
resource situation type.’ Special types of situations 
referred to by speech act verbs are called ‘special 
resource situation types.’
Classes of Speech Act Verbs
Special resource situation types constitute the frame­
work for the classification of different types of speech 
act verbs. They are built up from specifications of the 
role of the utterance and of the speaker attitudes, 
which are both elements of the general resource situ­
ation type. The set of speaker attitudes may be speci­
fied as consisting of the speaker’s attitude to the 
proposition, the speaker’s intention, and the speaker’s 
presuppositions. The speaker’s propositional attitude 
may be further specified as S’s taking P to be true, S’s 
wanting P, S’s evaluating P positively or negatively, 
and so on. Specifications of the speaker’s intention
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include S’s intention to make H believe something or 
to get him/her to do something. Examples of specifi­
cations of the speaker’s presuppositions are S’s pre­
supposition that H does not know P, that H will do 
P in the normal course of events, and that H is able to 
do P. The role of the utterance is specified by proper­
ties of the propositional content. These include the 
event type of P (that is, whether P is an action, event, 
or state of affairs), the agent of P (in the case that P is 
an action), and the temporal reference of P (specifi­
cally, whether P precedes, coincides with, or follows 
S’s uttering P).
Figure 1 shows the different types of specifica­
tions of each of the elements of the general resource 
situation type. Following a procedure proposed by 
Baumgartner (1977: 260-264), the specifications in 
Figure 1 are obtained from a comparison of sentences
containing speech act verbs. The well-formedness of 
some of these and the ill-formedness of others shows 
which elements are relevant to the meaning of the 
verbs they contain. For example, a comparison of the 
sentences 1 order you to leave the room, *1 order you 
to have left the room, and *1 order you for me to leave 
the room shows that to order lexicalizes the specifica­
tion ‘future action of H ’ for the properties of the 
propositional content.
Different combinations of specifications of the 
different kinds of speaker attitudes and of the proper­
ties of the propositional content constitute special 
resource situation types, which are referred to by 
distinct types of speech act verbs. The combinations 
listed in Table 1 represent situations that are referred 
to by specific types of verbs. Elements of the situa­
tions referred to are also components of the meaning
General resource situation type Specifications
Speaker
Hearer
Speaker
attitudes
Utterance
Speaker Intention
S wants: H know P
S wants: H recognise: S takes to be true: P 
S wants: H do P
S wants: H recognise: S wants to do: P 
S wants: H recognise: S evaluates P 
positively/negatively 
etc.
Figure 1 Specification of the elements of the general resource situation type.
914
Table 1 Classes of speech act verbs
(1a) Assertives: claim, assert....
Propositional attitude (S): S takes to be true: P
Intention (S): S wants: H recognize: S takes to be true: P
Presupposition (S): H does not know: P
Event type (P): Action/Event/State of Affairs
Temporal reference (P): [-FUTURE]/[ + FUTURE]
(1b) Information Verbs: inform, tell, impart, communicate, etc.
Propositional attitude (S): S knows: P
Intention (S): S wants: H know: P
Presupposition (S): H does not know: P
Event type (P): Action/Event/State of Affairs
Temporal reference (P): [-FUTURE]/[ + FUTURE]
(2) Directives: ask (sb. to do sth.), order, request... ,
Propositional attitude (S): S wants: P
Intention (S): S wants: H do P
Presupposition (S): H will not do P in the normal course of events
H is able to do P
Event type (P): Action
Agent (P): Hearer
Temporal reference (P): [ + FUTURE]
(3) Commissives: promise, guarantee, pledge, vow. • • i
Propositional attitude (S): S wants to do P
Intention (S): S wants: H recognise: S wants to do P
Presupposition (S): P is in the interest of H
Event type (P): Action
Agent (P): Speaker
Temporal reference (P): [ + FUTURE]
(4a) Verbs Expressing Emotions: rejoice, complain, scold. . . .
Propositional attitude (S): S feels joy/anger/sorrow because of P
Intention (S): S wants: H recognise: S feels joy/anger/sorrow because of P
Presupposition (S): P is the case
Event type (P): Action/Event/State of Affairs
Temporal reference (P): [-FUTURE]
(4b) Verbs Expressing Evaluations: praise, criticise . . . .
Propositional attitude (S): S evaluates P positively/negatively
Intention (S): S wants: H recognise: S evaluates P positively/negatively
Presupposition (S): P is the case
Event type (P): Action
Agent (P): Hearer or Third Person
Temporal reference (P): [-FUTURE]
of the corresponding verbs. If the assertives and infor­
mation verbs in Table 1 are subsumed under the larger 
class of representatives and verbs expressing emotions 
are grouped together with those expressing evalua­
tions, all speech act verbs in Table 1 may be classified 
as belonging to one of four main classes: representa­
tives, directives, commissives, and expressives. These 
correspond to four of the main types of speech acts 
distinguished by Searle (1975: 354-361). In addition, 
there exists a fifth class of verbs that may be used 
to refer to speech acts, which Searle called ‘declara­
tions.’ These are speech acts in which a particular 
institutional fact is brought about by a speaker who 
has the authority to do so because he or she is a 
representative of a particular institution. The perfor­
mance of declarations does not involve any particular 
speaker attitudes apart from the speaker’s being
willing to bring about the relevant institutional fact. 
Accordingly, declaratives, that is verbs used to refer to 
declarations, differ from other kinds of speech 
act verbs in that they lexicalize no speaker attitudes 
other than the speaker’s intention to bring about a 
particular institutional fact. Examples of declaratives 
include to absolve, to baptize, to bequeath, to con­
demn, to excommunicate, to fire, to nominate, and 
to resign.
Other classifications have much in common with 
Searle’s taxonomy. Austin’s (1962: 150-163) classifi­
cation of speech act verbs, for example, comprises 
five classes (expositives, exercitives, commissives, 
behabitives, and verdictives, which approximately cor­
respond to Searle’s representatives, directives, commis­
sives, expressives, and declarations, respectively). 
Vendler’s classification was based on Austin’s. Due
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to the fact that Vendler distinguished two types of 
exercitives (interrogatives and genuine exercitives) 
as well as two types of verdictives (operatives and 
true verdictives), his classification consists of seven 
rather than five classes (Vendler, 1972: 16-25). 
Bach and Harnish divided speech acts into six general 
categories. Four of these (constatives, directives, 
commissives, and acknowledgements) “correspond 
roughly to Austin’s expositives, exercitives, commis­
sives and behabitives respectively, and closely to 
Searle’s representatives, directives, commissives and 
expressives” (Bach and Harnish, 1979: 40-41). Taken 
together, the remaining two classes, effectives and 
verdictives, correspond to what Searle called “declara­
tions.” Using H ’s evaluations as criteria, Allan (1994: 
4125; 1998:10-11 (distinguished four types of speech 
acts. Statements include speech acts such as denials, 
reports, and predictions (Searle’s representatives) as 
well as promises and offers (Searle’s commissives). 
Invitationals are a subset of Searle’s directives and 
include speech acts such as requests, suggestions, exh­
ortations, and warnings. The rest of Searle’s directives 
are grouped together with his declarations into a class 
called ‘authoritatives.’ Expressives, finally, include 
greetings, thanks, apologies, and congratulations. 
Table 2 compares the classifications discussed.
Speech Acts and Speech Act Verbs
The examples considered so far suggest that the mean­
ings of speech act verbs may be described in terms of 
properties of speech acts. The components of speech 
acts and those of speech act verbs do indeed display 
substantial overlap. This may be observed from the 
fact that the components of the meanings of speech 
act verbs correspond to at least five of the seven com­
ponents of illocutionary force that serve to determine 
under which conditions a particular type of speech 
act is both successful and nondefective (Searle and
Vanderveken, 1985: 12-20). These correspondences 
are summarized in Figure 2.
In spite of these correspondences, special resource 
situation types do not suffice to capture the meaning 
of all speech act verbs. Examples of verbs whose 
meanings cannot completely be described in terms 
of elements of special resource situation types are 
boast, flatter, and lie. In addition to the attitudes of 
a resource situation speaker, these verbs lexicalize 
different types of evaluations by a speaker who uses 
these verbs to describe the speech act of the resource 
situation speaker. Following Barwise and Perry (1983: 
32-39), here I call the situation in which a speaker 
describes an act performed by a resource situation 
speaker the ‘discourse situation.’ As Figure 3 shows, 
the discourse situation comprises the same types of 
elements as the resource situation: a speaker, a hearer, 
and an utterance containing a proposition. The mean­
ing of verbs such as boast, flatter, and lie comprises 
elements of a resource as well as a discourse situation. 
For example, boast lexicalizes not only a positive 
evaluation of P (one of S’s own actions or properties) 
by the speaker of the resource situation but also a 
negative evaluation of the resource situation speaker’s 
positive representation of P by a discourse situation 
speaker. In particular, a discourse situation speaker 
describing a resource situation speaker’s act of self- 
praise by means of the verb boast thereby indicates 
that he or she considers the resource situation speak­
er’s positive representation of P to be exaggerated. 
Similarly, flatter and lie lexicalize a combination of 
attitudes of a resource situation speaker as well as a 
discourse situation speaker’s evaluation of the speech 
act performed by the resource situation speaker 
as being strategic (flatter) or insincere (lie). These 
examples show that for many illocutionary verbs, 
there is no corresponding speech act. Nor may any 
type of speech act be referred to by a corresponding 
illocutionary verb. An example is the apparent lack of
Table 2 Different types of classifications of speech acts/speech act verbs
Austin (1962) Vendler (1972) Searle (1975) Bach & Harnish (1979) Allan (1994)
Expositives Expositives Representatives Constatives
Statements
Commissives Commissives Commissives Commissives
Exercitives
Interrogatives
Directives Directives
Invitationals
Exercitives
Authoritatives
Verdictives
Operatives
Declarations
Effectives
Verdictives Verdictives
Behabitives Behabitives Expressives Acknowledgements Expressives
Source'. Allan (1998: 11).
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Components of illocuationary force Components of the meaning of speech act verbs
Figure 2 Correspondences between components of illocutionary force and components of the meaning of speech act verbs.
Discourse situation Resource situation
Figure 3 The inventory of situational roles of the discourse 
and the resource situation (SDS, discourse situation speaker; 
SRS, resource situation speaker; PDS, proposition uttered by 
SDS; P r s . proposition uttered by SBS; Hos, discourse situation hear-
er; Hr s, resource situation hearer). From Harras et al. (2004: 10); 
used with permission of Walter de Gruyter, GmbH. & Co.
a special illocutionary verb in English to refer to an 
act in which a speaker predicts a future event that he 
or she considers to have negative consequences. 
Although there are special illocutionary verbs to 
describe such acts in German (e.g., unken) and 
Russian (e.g., karkat), the relevant act has to be 
referred to in English by less specific verbs such 
predict, foretell, and prophesy, whose meanings do 
not include an evaluative component.
The lack of a one-to-one correspondence of speech 
acts and speech act verbs also becomes evident from 
the fact that some verbs are systematically ambiguous
among several illocutionary points (Vanderveken, 
1990: 168). For example, to promise may be used to 
refer to acts of threatening (as in I promised him that 
he would be punished if  he did not come back in 
time), acts of promising (as in I promised to help 
him), and acts of assuring somebody of something 
(as in I promised her that she would be free tomorrow 
uttered by a speaker who is not the agent of P but only 
a confident news bearer). Other examples are warn 
and advise, which may both be classified as being 
either representatives (verbs used to denote an act of 
telling somebody that something is the case) or direc­
tives (verbs used to refer to an act of telling somebody 
to do something to avoid an imminent danger) (Searle 
and Vanderveken, 1985: 183). In spite of Austin’s 
claim that speech act verbs are a good guide to speech 
acts (Austin 1962: 148-149), the absence of a one-to- 
one correspondence between speech acts and speech 
act verbs indicates that differences in the meaning 
of speech act verbs are “a good guide but by no 
means a sure guide to differences in illocutionary 
acts” (Searle, 1975: 345).
Performativity
Some speech act verbs can be used not only to denote 
but also to perform a particular speech act. To test 
whether a given speech act verb may be used in this 
way, Austin suggested that it be substituted for the 
variable x  in the formula ‘I (hereby) x . . . ’. Any verb 
that may be used as a part of this formula may be 
used performatively (Austin, 1962: 67). Examples of
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performative verbs are to order, to promise, to in­
form, to criticize, and to assert. The performative 
formula is often part of the institutionalized proce­
dure by which a speaker brings about a particular 
institutional fact. Consequently, declaratives may 
generally be used performatively as in I hereby name 
this ship the ‘Queen Elisabeth’ and I appoint you 
chairman. Other types of speech act verbs can be 
used performatively only if they may be used in utter­
ances that do not require an additional linguistic or 
nonlinguistic action for a particular speech act to be 
performed. For example, a speaker may promise a 
hearer to help him or her solely by uttering a sentence 
such as I promise to help you tomorrow. By contrast, 
an act of convincing somebody that something is the 
case requires more than a speaker’s uttering a sentence 
such as ?/ convince you that Beowulf is the single most 
important work o f English literature. This difference 
accounts for the fact that to promise may be used 
performatively, whereas to convince may not (Harras 
2004: 15 2 -15 4 ).
See also: Frame Semantics; Lexical Fields; Lexical 
Semantics; Lexicology; Performative Clauses; Situation 
Semantics; Speech Acts; Speech Acts and Al Planning 
Theory; Speech Acts and Grammar.
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